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Abstract
We conduct a field experiment in 31 primary schools in England to test the ef-
fectiveness of different temporary incentive schemes, a standard individual based
incentive scheme and a competitive scheme, on increasing the choice and consump-
tion of healthy items at lunchtime. The individual scheme has a weak positive effect
that masks significantly differential effects by age whereas all students respond to
positively to the competitive scheme. For our sample of interest, the competitive
scheme increases choice of healthy items by 33% and consumption of healthy items
by 48%, twice and three times as much as in the individual incentive scheme, respec-
tively. The positive effects generally carry over to the week immediately following
the treatment but we find little evidence of any effects six months later. Our results
show that incentives can work, at least temporarily, to increase healthy eating but
that there are large differences in effectiveness between schemes. Furthermore it is
important to analyse things at the individual level as average effects appear to be
masking significant heterogeneous effects that are predicted by the health literature.
JEL Classification: J13, I18, I28, H51, H52
Keywords: Incentives, Health, Habits, Child nutrition, Field experiments
∗We thank the Esme Fairbairn Foundation for their financial support (grant number 10-2206). This pa-
per was previously circulated as “Changing Eating Habits: A Field Experiment in Primary Schools.” We
thank seminar and workshop participants at Aarhus, Bath, Bristol, Ghent, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Essex,
Queen’s University Belfast, Oslo, Cologne, ‘The Determinants of Dietary Choices: An Interdisciplinary
Approach’ in Edinburgh (2013), the Royal Economic Society annual conference (2013), the Florence
Workshop on Behavioural and Experimental Economics (2013), the International Conference in Public
Policy (2013), the European Economic Association annual conference (2013) and the European Society
of Population Economics annual congress (2014). Finally, we especially thank all the local authorities,
schools, lunch monitors, parents, and children who helped and participated in the experiment.
†University of Edinburgh, email: Michele.Belot@ed.ac.uk
‡Corresponding Author. University of Bath, email: jj412@bath.ac.uk
§University of Essex, email: pjnolen@essex.ac.uk
1. Introduction
Poor nutrition is a primary cause behind the rising cost of health care in many developed
countries.1 According to the World Health Organization (2009) poor nutrition is related
to three of the five highest risks for morality in the world: high blood pressure; high
blood glucose; and overweight and obesity. In response, policy makers have been push-
ing information interventions, such as the “5-a-day” campaign in the UK, to encourage
people to develop better eating habits. However, the success of these campaigns has been
moderate.2 Because of this lack of success, alternative interventions designed around in-
sights from behavioural economics have recently received attention among policy circles,
with, for example, a number of initiatives considered by the “Nudge-Unit” in the UK
government.3
One instrument that is currently debated is the use of schemes that reward good
behavior.4 Recent research in education (see Angrist and Lavy (2009), Angrist, Lang,
and Oreopoulos (2009), or Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton (2009)), smoking cessation (see
Volpp et. al (2009) and Gine´ et. al. (2011)), and exercise (see Charness and Gneezy
(2009) and Acland and Levy (2013)) has shown that incentives can induce individuals to
engage in positive behaviour. Furthermore, the research on exercise has even shown that
the habits developed during the incentive period can carry over to the post-intervention
period, though, it is unclear how long any behavioural changes may last (see Acland
and Levy (2013) and Charness and Gneezy (2009)). However, as pointed out by Rabin
(2011), we still know very little about which health behaviours are really habitual, how
important habits are, and, in particular, what type of incentive schemes are most effective
in changing those bad habits.5 In light of this debate we conduct an experiment using
thirty-one primary schools in England to look at the effect of two different incentive
schemes, a standard individual based incentive scheme and a competitive scheme, on
changing choice and consumption of healthy items by school aged children. We compare
and contrast effectiveness of the schemes and examine whether the effects last after the
intervention period.
1See Bhattacharya and Sood (2011) for an overview of the costs of obesity.
2See Ciliska et al. (2000) for a review of many community based interventions. They appear to have
been successful at informing people but have had less success in changing actual behaviour (see Robertson
(2008) and Verplanken and Wood (2006)).
3See the Behavioural Insights Team (2010) publication for a recent overview of initiatives discussed
in the UK targeting a range of health-related behaviours
4See the NICE citizens council report (http://www.nice.org.uk/media/9AF/56/CCReportIncentives.pdf)
for a review of the issues of the National Health Service (NHS) using incentives to change health related
behaviour.
5See Gneezy et al. (2011) for a longer discussion regarding when and why incentives may change
behaviour.
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In relation to nutrition, it is actually an open question if rewarding individuals for
eating healthier will have any effect on behaviour or will play any long lasting role in
solving the problems caused by poor nutrition. Indeed, there is evidence showing that
rewarding children for eating healthy items can lead to those items being less preferred
(using self-reports as a measure of preference) or displace intrinsic motivation.6 Recent
work by Just and Price (2013) has shown that schools where short term rewards are given
for eating healthy items does lead to an increase in the proportion of children consuming
a serving of fruits or vegetables at lunch time. Two weeks after the incentive is removed,
however, there is no lasting change in the amount of fruits and vegetables consumed at
the project schools. The lack of longer term effects could be due to the intervention
period being too short or the incentive scheme not being effective enough. They argue
that despite the potential for external incentives to crowd out intrinsic motivation (see
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) for an example) the evidence suggests that incentivising
healthy choices using individual incentives can work.
The recent work on incentivising healthy eating, though, has focused on the average
effect at the school or class level of an individual incentive (providing a small reward for
eating healthily). However one robust finding in the literature is that health interventions
tend to be less effective for boys and children from poorer socio-economic backgrounds
(see Muller et al. (2005), Perry et al. (1998) and Kelder et al. (1995)). Recent work has
shown that those two groups are more impatient than other children7 and those differences
could explain why these children are less likely to make healthy dietary choices. This is of
particular concern because boys and children of poorer socio-economic status tend to have
worse eating habits and are more likely to develop nutrition-related diseases. Therefore,
while, on average, the number of healthy items consumed at an intervention schools may
increase, vulnerable groups may eat worse due to the intervention. In terms of societal
welfare, one may not want to implement a policy if the increase in the proportion of
healthy items consumed is driven by an increase in consumption by those already eating
healthily while those eating poorly decrease their consumption. However, since boys and
children from poorer socio-economic backgrounds are more impatient, they may be the
ones more likely to respond to the immediate rewards from the interventions. Therefore,
given the push by policy makers to introduce individual based incentives for health eating
it is of utmost importance to examine the effect on subgroups.
Examining the individual level effects is also of particular importance because of recent
6See Birch et. al. (1982), Birch et. al. (1984), and Newman and Taylor. (1992) for examples.
7See Delaney and Doyle (2012) for children from poorer socio-economic backgrounds and Bettinger
and Slonim (2007) for boys versus girls.
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insights from behavioural economics. Specifically, immediate incentives may affect choices
by exploiting behavioural anomalies that underlie the ‘unhealthy’ behaviours. For exam-
ple, present-biased (hyperbolic) preferences, such as those discussed in Laibson (1997) and
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), can explain unhealthy dietary choices despite an individ-
ual being fully aware of (having all the information about) the effects of poor nutrition
and the benefits of healthy eating: individuals may over-weight the initial costs of eating
healthier and (or) under-weight the longer term benefits. Thus, using a temporary and
effective incentive scheme to encourage healthier eating among children could lead to long
term dietary habit changes.8 Therefore, it is vital to know what incentive schemes are
effective for which groups or one may be implementing a policy that causes those already
eating poorly to have even worse long term eating habits because of the intervention.
The effectiveness of different interventions on changing behavior has not been widely
examined.9 In designing our experiment we wanted to compare the commonly used indi-
vidual incentive scheme to another scheme specifically designed to target the two groups
that typically do not respond to health interventions: boys and children from poorer socio-
economic backgrounds. There is a well-established literature showing that boys tend to be
more competitive than girls (see Geenzy et. al (2003), Gneezy and Rustichini (2004), and
Booth and Nolen (2012)) yet competitive incentives have not yet been studied in exercise
or health. Given the gender differences in incentivizing healthy eating, a competitive
scheme such as a tournament may be more effective, on average, than an individual based
compensation scheme because it could get boys to chose and consume more healthy items.
Of course, if girls are discouraged from eating healthily by a competitive incentive, there
may be no difference on average. With this in mind we designed out field experiment to
allow us to compare a competitive tournament and an individual based incentive scheme
on population sub-groups.
Besides focusing on effects during the treatment period we also look at the medium
and longer term effects of both intervention schemes. Like most other papers in this
area, we examined the effect of the intervention immediately after it was removed (in the
week following cessation). However, we also look at longer term effects by following up
with subjects six months after the intervention finished. Therefore we can examine the
effects of the two incentive schemes on medium and longer run behaviour and if there are
differential effects for sub-groups in the medium or longer run. Using two schemes may
8Work by Kelder et. al. (1994), Resnicow et. al. (1998), and Singer et. al. (1995) suggest that
dietary habits appear to form in childhood and track into adulthood.
9Some work has looked at the effect of information only campaigns versus interventions with individual
based incentives with small prizes (see List and Samek (2014) for example) but we know of no study that
has looked at two reward based schemes.
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also allow us examine why Just and Price (2013) found no effects beyond two weeks.
Our paper has two major contributions: it compares two reward based incentive
schemes designed to increase healthy eating; furthermore, it examines the differential
effects of those two schemes on key subgroups of children. Our experimental data also
allows us to examine differences in the how the two incentive schemes are working and
what theories are broadly consistent with the results. We also discuss how these contri-
butions fit into the habit formation literature by looking at choice and consumption of
healthy items both immediately after the incentives have been removed and six months
later.
We find that incentivising children to choose fruit or vegetables has an overall positive
effect on both choice and consumption: on average children choose 3% more fruits and
vegetables and consume 4.5% more than the control group, though, the results are not
precisely estimated. These effects are about one fifteenth of those found in Just and
Price (2013) but our students were more than twice as likely to choose and consume
healthy items in the baseline. The accurate comparison is what we call the less than
100% choice group later in the paper; they increased choice by 19% and consumption
by 17%.10 Those results suggest that the incentive is changing the behaviour of those
students with initially poor eating habits. However, the competition treatment is nearly
twice as effective in getting children to choose a healthy item and over three times as
effective at getting children to consume healthy items. For the group of interest we have:
children in the competitive scheme choose healthy items 33% more often than those in
the control group and consume healthy items 48% more.
When we look at the effects on subgroups by scheme we get our starkest finding, the
individual incentive has a small positive effect on choice and consumption but the effect
differs significantly by age. We find that younger children respond negatively and older
children respond positively to the incentive. These results are consistent with the non-
monotonic results of neophobia (the predisposition to reject novel food) by age discussed
in the health literature on how food preferences develop11 and suggests that only looking
at the average effect conceals important heterogeneous differences. In fact if eating habits
are developed at a younger age than the individual incentive scheme could have a more
negative effect than we find because the younger students will be eating worse when they
10List and Samek (2014) also found larger effects but they look at snacking after school so the results
are not comparable.
11See Birch (1999) for a good summary of the development of food preference and neophobia. Birch
and Marlin (1982), Birch et. al. (1987, 1998), Sullivan and Birch (1990), and Cooke et. al. (2003) also
provide strong evidence about the role of overcoming neophobia through repeated exposure to a new food
or flavours. Neophobia should be decreasing over the age of our sample meaning that the stark age effects
- that year five children respond more to both incentive schemes - are consistent with the literature.
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get to be the same age as the older students in our study. In contrast, the competitive
incentive scheme has no significant heterogeneous effects by subgroup: everyone chooses
and consumes more healthy items.
When looking at subgroups we find that, in general, females, students from poorer
socio-economic backgrounds, and younger children respond more positively to competition
than the individual based incentive. Boys, older children, and students from wealthier
socio-economic backgrounds respond positively to both the competitive and the individual
incentive scheme, though, the estimated effect is larger for the competition treatment
in nearly every case. This suggests that using a competitive incentive could improve
effectiveness by increasing the choice and consumption of those already responding to the
individual scheme and those groups that typically do not respond to health interventions.
Furthermore, unlike in the individual based scheme, we find no one responding negatively
to competition.
The results presented in this paper are important for policy makers and health officials
trying to fight problems associated with poor nutrition. It shows that positive incentives
do work in encouraging healthy dietary choices and that the results of a short term
intervention can have lasting effects after the intervention period but that a “one-size-fits-
all” reward scheme will not likely work. The differential effects by subgroup suggest that
health incentives need to be evaluated at the individual level and, consequently, different
policies may have to be developed for different subgroups or an incentive scheme other
than the standard individual scheme may have to be considered. Furthermore, increasing
the length of time an intervention is taking place is not the only way policy makers can
increase the likelihood that positive behaviours are adopted: for instance, competitions
could be more effective than individual-based schemes at changing behaviour in the same
time period.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present
the experimental design. In Section 3, we present a simple conceptual framework and
hypotheses that guide the analysis of the results. We present the results in Section 4 and
conclude in Section 5.
2. Experimental Design
To examine the effect of two incentive schemes on the choice and consumption of healthy
items we conducted a field experiment in England. We recruited schools in a three step
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process.12 First we approached all 150 Local Education Authorities (LEAs) in England
to ask if they would be interested in participating; 22 responded positively. Second,
we provided more information about the project to LEAs that responded and set-up
meetings with them to answer questions and discuss how to recruit schools. We indicated
to LEAs that we were interested in testing and comparing the effectiveness of incentives
schemes in increasing choice and consumption of fruit or vegetables at lunchtime and
that the interventions were specifically designed to target children who were generally
considered unresponsive to health interventions. After the meetings 12 LEAs agreed to
let us approach their schools and provided a list of at least three schools that would
consider being involved. Finally we approached all 46 schools suggested by the LEAs; 31
of them agreed to participate.
We recruited children from year two (aged 6 and 7) and year five (aged 9 and 10) in
participating schools. Parents were provided with information about the study, asked to
fill out a questionnaire, and were required to give consent to have data collected about
their child. As agreed with the schools, all children in years two and five were included
in the project. However, data about choice and consumption of fruit or vegetables were
only recorded for children whose parents gave permission. Therefore, we have data on
638 children for the main part of the analysis.
Randomisation
We randomly allocated schools to one of three groups: control; competition; or individual
incentive. We were particularly careful to make sure that, ex ante, the average school in
each group had roughly the same number of children and looked the same in terms of
school characteristics.
Within LEA schools were randomly assigned to treatment arms such that the overall
sample was balanced based on observables. For the purpose of balancing the three groups
we used the following characteristics: (i) proportion of female pupils; (ii) number of pupils;
(iii) number of pupils in class groups (year 2 and year 5); (iv) proportion of children
eligible for free school meals; (v) proportion of children eating free school meals; (vi)
per pupil expenditure; (vii) per pupil expenditure on catering; (viii) percent of children
achieving level 4 in both English and Mathematics; (ix) average point scores of children
on level 4 exams; (x) average percent of children absent on a given day; (xi) percent of
children absent from the level 4 exams; (xii) school type (religious or comprehensive);
(xiii) whether a school was involved in the “Food for Life” Programme; (xiv) Ofsted
12A companion paper, Belot and James (2013), documents the selection process of which schools choose
to participate in this experiment. In particular they find that selection on observables and unobservables
is unlikely to drive the results.
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School Categorization; and (xv) Ofsted Health Categorization (OfHealth).
The variables listed above were used to make sure that the average school in each
treatment arm was similar in ways that could have influenced whether the treatment
scheme worked: socio-economic background of the student body; school quality; student
quality; and school type.13 Using a random number generator, schools were assigned to
one of the three treatment arms. We then checked to see if the sample was balanced based
on the 15 observable characteristics. If it was not, we re-started the randomization. This
ensures that, ex ante, at the school level, our sample was balanced by treatment arm.
Treatments
The two treatments we designed incentivise choice (rather than consumption) of fruit or
vegetables at lunch. We decided to incentivise choice for a few reasons. First, the health
literature highlights how making rewards contingent on consumption of a particular food
can cause children to have a lower preference for that item (see Birch et. al. (1982, 1984)
and Newman and Taylor (1992) for examples). We wanted to minimise the potential for
negative effects on healthy eating. Second, we wanted the experiment to be something
that was relevant to policy and simpler to implement. Rewarding for choice removes any
subjective judgement of the monitor to decide what constitutes an adequate amount of
food consumed to be rewarded. Furthermore, schools can require children to take a fruit
or vegetable at lunch but are unlikely to be able to force them to eat the item. Therefore
the results of our study are likely to be more relevant to policies that are being considered
at the school level now.14 Third, we also wanted the program to involve minimal costs.
Monitors, individual who recorded the choice and consumption of healthy items, were
already people working in the school and with the children at lunch time. While we could
have considered a multi-component approach such as “Food Dudes,” combining such as
aspects as bringing in role models, monitoring choices for each type of fruit or vegetable
chosen, etc. this would have required a larger investment of resources and likely been too
expensive for many schools to adopt (see Horne et. al. (1995, 1998)). Finally, rewarding
for choice rather than actually consuming an item negates the possibility of cheating. For
13Variables (i), (ii), and (iii) relate to the demographic characteristics of the schools involved. Variables
(iv) and (v) relate to the economic background of the children. Variables (vi) and (vii) relate to the
financial expenditure at the school level. Variables (viii) - (xi) relate to the quality of the student
body at each school. Variable (xii) denotes if a school has a religious affiliation. Variable (xiii) denotes
whether the school voluntarily chose to be part of the “Food for Life” programme which involves schools
agree to teach children about healthy eating (See http://www.foodforlife.org.uk/ for further information).
Variable (xiv) is the overall classification of the school based on its Ofsted results: 1 = outstanding; 2 =
good; 3 = requires improvement; and 4 = inadequate. Variable (xv) relates to the extent to which the
pupils adopt a healthy lifestyle.
14Indeed the results of our study are especially relevant to determine if providing (or requiring a student
to take) a fruit or vegetable at lunchtime has any follow through effect on consumption behaviour.
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example, if rewards were based on eating the pupil has an incentive to dispose of the
fruit or vegetable; the student may hide it, give it to a friend or try to mislead monitors
regarding actual consumption. For this reason, monitoring consumption is more reliable
when choice is incentivised and we will be able to check if children eat healthier options
or not.
In both of our experimental schemes, the standard individual and competitive, the
pupils were given a sticker for choosing or bringing in a fruit or vegetable at lunch.15 The
individual incentive scheme was chosen because it is similar to many of the other individual
based incentive schemes used in the healthy eating and habit formation literature (for
instance, see Charness and Gneezy (2009), Just and Price (2013), or List and Samek
(2014)). The competition was chosen because the literature on gender and competition
suggests that boys respond more to competition than girls (see Gneezy and Rustichini
(2004), Gneezy et. al. (2003), and Booth and Nolen (2012)). Given that boys tend
not to respond to traditional healthy eating interventions, the competition was seen as
an incentive scheme that could get boys to respond. However, gender differences in
competition can vary by task (see Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2011)). Therefore if the task
of choosing a healthily item is viewed as a ‘favouring females’ then even the competitive
scheme might not get boys to choose or consume fruit or vegetables.
In both schemes children received a sticker every day they chose or brought in a fruit
or vegetable at lunchtime. Then, at the end of the week (Friday afternoon after lunch),
each student had the opportunity to pick a larger prize depending on the incentive scheme
in which the student was enrolled. In the individual incentive scheme, if a student col-
lected four stickers in the week she or he was allowed to choose a prize such as an item
of stationery or a small toy from a reward box. If the student had three or less stickers,
though, the student could not pick a prize and the stickers did not count to earning an
award next week. In the competition, children were assigned to random groups of four,
and only the student with the most stickers in each group was able to select a prize from
the reward box.16 In the case of a tie all children with the highest number of stickers in
the group were eligible for a prize. The groups were revealed at the end of the week after
lunch so children would not engage in strategic behaviour, such as making choices based
on other group member’s actions or absenteeism. For example, if a pupil was absent on
Monday then the others in their group would know that that pupil could only collect a
15Examples of the stickers can be seen in the appendix. All children were given a list of fruits and
vegetables that would be rewarded if they were included in packed lunches; the list is also included in
the appendix.
16See appendix for pictures of some of the rewards from which children were allowed to choose.
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maximum of four stickers. The groups were changed each week so the children could not
anticipate with whom they would be competing and, in this treatment as well, unused
stickers did not carry over to the next week.
Timing
Before the interventions began a background survey was sent to the parents that covered
information on age, gender, ethnicity, primary language, height, weight, and typical di-
etary habits. Then, starting the second week of October, we monitored what children ate
at lunch in all 31 schools. Lunch monitors17 recorded if a student chose a fruit or vegetable
or brought a fruit or vegetable in with a packed lunch and if the student consumed none,
some, or more than half the item. On Friday that week children took a food knowledge
test and a “spot-the-difference” test.18 The food knowledge test required students to
identify seven pictures of different items (e.g. celery or snickers bar) and mark if each
item was healthy or not. The “spot-the-difference” test was designed to test a student’s
concentration and required a student to compare two sets of 30 dice that were arranged in
a six-by-five square. There were five differences between the two sets of dice; the student
was asked to circle the five differences. Children had 10 minutes to complete each test.
The children went on half-term break for one week after the baseline data was collected.
Upon returning to school the children were reminded of the project and children were
monitored for the next five weeks. At control schools, the lunch monitors continued to
monitor children in the same way they did during the week in October: they collected
data on whether a student choose or consumed a fruit or vegetable. At the competition
and individual incentive schools children were incentivised to choose a fruit or vegetable
for a period of four weeks19. Each day a student choose or brought in a fruit or vegetable
with a packed lunch20 the student received a sticker. Furthermore, as discussed above,
at the end of each week, children would get a large prize based on the type of incentive
scheme in which they were enrolled.
On the fourth Friday of the treatment, the children completed another food knowledge
and “spot-the-difference” test and were reminded that it was the last day of incentives.
The following week, immediately after the treatment, the choices and consumption of
children were still monitored. This allows us to see if there was any effect on choice and
17Lunch monitors were dinner ladies who worked in the cafeteria or school assistants who were normally
present at lunch time and sat with the children as usual during the lunch period.
18Examples of both can be seen in the appendix.
19Just and Price (2013) incentivised children for a period of 2-3 weeks and found no longer run effects.
Therefore, we chose to incentivise children for a longer period of time; 1-2 weeks longer.
20With the questionnaire and again at the start of the five weeks of monitoring, the parents of all
children received lists of what items would count as healthy if they were included with packed lunches.
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consumption after the incentives were removed. To examine the longer term effects of
the incentives we also went back to schools six months later, in June, and monitored the
choice and consumption of the same children.
3. Conceptual Framework & Hypotheses
We designed our field experiment to test the three hypotheses laid out below, to examine
whether there were heterogeneous effects of incentives, and to compare the two incentive
schemes.
Hypothesis 1: Children will choose more fruit or vegetables when they are rewarded for
taking a fruit or vegetable at lunchtime.
By providing a reward for choosing a healthy option, the benefit of taking a fruit or
vegetable at lunchtime will have increased for each student. Therefore we would expect
that, while the incentive scheme is running, children are more likely to choose a fruit
or vegetable. This would be consistent with the work by Gneezy and Charness (2009),
Just and Price (2013), and List and Samek (2014). Furthermore, the effect is likely to
differ by subgroups. Since boys and children from poorer socio-economic backgrounds
have been shown to be more impatient (see Delany and Doyle (2012) and Bettinger and
Slonim (2007)) then they may respond more positively to the immediate reward. The lit-
erature has also shown that there are gender differences in responses to information only
campaings (see Muller et al. (2005), Perry et al. (1998) and Kelder et al. (1995)). The
health literature highlights age effects with regards to food preferences and tastes (see
Birch (1999) and the references therein); suggesting that there is likely to be differences
in the effect of the incentive by age as well.
Hypothesis 2: Children will consume more fruit or vegetables when they are rewarded
for taking a fruit or vegetable at lunchtime.
The behavioural literature has shown us that the default option can affect choices made
by individuals (see Keller et. al. (2011), Choi et. al. (2003), and Johnson and Goldstein
(2003) for examples) and even help reduce calorie consumption (Wisdom et. al. (2010)).
As a result health initiatives at schools have started to require children to have a fruit
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or vegetable on their plate.21 By incentivizing children to take a fruit or vegetable our
experiment is likely to have a follow-through effect on consumption. Furthermore, unlike
previous studies, our children have no incentive to lie or cheat regarding the amount of
the fruit or vegetable they consumed; the rewards are only based on choice. This means
that we can estimate the causal effect of how an increase in having a fruit or vegetable
on one’s lunch tray effects consumption. As with choice, there is reason to expect that
the effect on consumption will vary with gender, age, and socio-economic background.
Hypothesis 3: Children will choose and consume more fruit or vegetables after the in-
centive is removed than before.
Given how food preferences develop, if children have been eating more fruit or vegetables
during the intervention period they may have developed a preference for fruit or vegeta-
bles or developed a habit of eating fruit or vegetables at lunch time.22 Becker and Murphy
(1988) and Becker (1992) develop a model of habit formation where the marginal utility of
today’s consumption is correlated with historical consumption. Therefore a small change
in today’s behaviour - caused by an exogenous increase in the benefit of consuming a
fruit or vegetable for instance - could lead to long term changes in consumption. More
recently theory on present-bias (hyperbolic) preferences such as that in Laibson (1997)
and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) suggest that providing incentives to overcome the
initial costs of switching to healthy behaviour may have long lasting effects (see Acland
and Levy (2013) for instance). Of course, if the extrinsic incentive replaced the intrinsic
motivation that children had to eat healthily before the intervention, then after the prizes
are removed we may see a decrease in the amount of healthy items chosen and consumed.
Therefore, to see if there is a lasting effect (positive or negative) of the two schemes we ex-
amine choice and consumption of fruits and vegetables in the week immediately following
the intervention and six months later.
4. Results
4.1 Summary Statistics
We begin by comparing our treatment and control schools in the baseline period. The
upper half of Table 1 presents the means of the outcome variables and other covariates
21See Dillon and Lane (1989) for an evaluation of the differences between offering and serving a fruit
or vegetable and Just and Price (2013a) for the effect of requiring schools to serve healthy items.
22There is some evidence that dietary habits appear to form in childhood and track into adulthood.
See Kelder et. al. (1994), Resnicow et. al. (1998), and Singer et. al. (1995) for discussions.
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by control and both treatment groups. The final three columns show the p-values for
differences between the treatments and control and between the two treatments. The p-
value were calculated, to account for intra-school correlation, by regressing each baseline
variable on one of the treatment indicators, and clustering the standard errors at the school
level. We have 31 schools in our sample but, when looking at sub-samples, our analysis
may contain less than 30 schools. Therefore, the standard clustering methods might not be
appropriate. To deal with this we correct for the potential clustering problems using the
the Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) wild bootstrap method with 1000 replications.
The p-values shown in Table 1 are based on this cluster correction method, though, in
this case, the standard clustering method gives nearly identical results.
The upper half of Table 1 shows that, for the whole sample, there are no statistically
significant differences between the control group and either treatment group. We do have
one significant difference when we compare the two treatments but that is far less than
the seven at the 10% level we would randomly expect from conducting the 69 tests in this
panel. This suggests that, based on observables, the randomization worked as expected.
Furthermore, even though they are insignificant, the size of the differences (in most cases)
is less than one standard deviation, suggesting that the control and treatment groups are
close to being observationally equivalent in the baseline.
The lower part of the Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the sample of pupils
who chose a healthy item at lunch less than 100% of the time in the baseline week. This
group is of interest because they are the ones who were most able to change their behaviour
due to the treatment, as opposed to those who already chose a fruit or vegetable every
day. Of the 69 tests presented in this panel we only find four significant differences at
the 10% level; again, this is far below the seven significant differences one would expect
to occur randomly. Furthermore, as with the whole sample, the size of the differences
are generally less than one standard deviation suggesting that, again, the control and
treatment groups are close to being observationally equivalent in the baseline.
4.2 Descriptive Figures
We will examine the effects of the incentive schemes on both choice and consumption.
The “choice” variable is a dummy equal to one if a student choose a fruit or vegetable on
a given day. To get at consumption we will use a “try” variable which will equal one if the
student eats at least some of a fruit or vegetable on that day.23 Since the incentive was
23We also examined the intensity of consumption by looking at whether students ate more than half
their fruit or vegetable. The results are broadly similar to our findings with ‘try’ and there is the
possibility of subjectivity due to lunch monitors judging what is more than half. Therefore, we include
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based on the total amount of healthy choices made in a week, we provide a descriptive
overview of the weekly mean outcomes for choice and consumption in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 shows the effect of our treatments on choosing a healthy item. Panel (a)
shows the full sample. During the baseline, students in control and treatment schools
were choosing a healthy item with their lunch, roughly, 83% of the time. In the individual
incentive scheme, to earn a small prize at the end of the week a student would have to
choose a healthy item four times, 80% of the time. Therefore, on average, students already
qualified for a prize in the individual incentive scheme. However, with the introduction
of the incentives in week one, students in both treatments began to choose significantly
more healthy items. Over time, though, the control group improves their eating habits
and catches up to the treatment groups. In panel (b) of Figure 1 we see the effect of the
treatment on students who did not choose healthy items 100% of the time in baseline,
those with room to improve their behaviour. During baseline there is no difference in
behaviour for students between the treatments or the control. In week one students who
received an incentive choose healthy items more but the control group catches up quicker
in this sample. Overall, this figure shows that students would gradually begin to make
healthier choices after returning from a mid-term break, since the intervention started
after the autumn holiday, but that the intervention can speed the return to healthier
behaviour by getting students to make better choices immediately upon return to school.
Figure 2 shows the effect of the treatments on trying a healthy item. In panel (a) we
again see the full sample. In the baseline there is no significant differences between the
treatment and the control (refer to Table 1). The control group is much slower to improve
their consumption of healthy items upon returning to school in comparison to choosing
a healthy item; they only show a small increase in week three that seems to persist in
week four and the week after the treatment. However the treatments have an immediate
and significant effect: students increase their consumption of healthy items by, roughly,
12%. After two weeks, though, the effect of the individual incentive appears to dissipate
while the effect of the competition stays constant. Panel (b) shows the effects for the
sample that did not choose healthy items 100% of the time in the baseline. Here we see
roughly the same results as we did with choice. The interventions increase consumption
immediately but the control group catches up quicker than in the overall sample. Here,
though, competition may be working better and still having an effect in the last two
weeks of the experiment. Overall, this figure shows that students are much less likely to
improve their consumption of healthy items when returning from a mid-term break and
those results in the appendix for the interested reader
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that at least the competitive incentive scheme can have a positive and consistent effect in
increasing consumption of healthy items.
4.3 Short and Medium Term Effects
We begin by reporting the average treatment effects for the main outcome variables of
interest: choice and try. We discuss the results for the short-term (while the intervention is
taking place) and the medium term (the week immediately after the intervention finishes).
Our primary estimation method is a linear probability model (LPM) with student fixed
effects (FE). This technique allows us to examine within-subject treatment effects and
the comparison to the control group allows us to control for any day and week effects that
might be present over the course of our field experiment.
Since the randomization was conducted at the school level it is important to cluster
standard errors by school. In the overall sample, when we do not look at subgroups,
we have 31 schools so standard clustering methods are possible. However, when we look
at subgroups, especially age, the number of schools in our sample may drop below 30.24
Therefore, standard clustering methods might not be appropriate. To calculate appro-
priate standard errors we use the Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) wild bootstrap
method. In all of our result tables we report both the standard errors clustered at the
school level using standard methods and the p-value from the wild bootstrap. There are
very few instances where the results are different.
The dependent variable in our regressions is bounded upwards (at 1); children who
choose and consumed a fruit or vegetable every day at baseline have an outcome variable
equal to one and no improvement is possible for this group. Therefore, we estimate the
LPM with student FE on the whole sample and on the sample of children who are not
bounded upwards in their response, i.e. those who did not have a mean outcome equal
to one in the baseline (referred to later as “Less than 100%” group). We are particularly
interested in the latter group because those who are not choosing or consuming a fruit or
vegetable every day is the subgroup that could most benefit from the intervention - they
could be encouraged to make healthier choices.
Average treatment effects on choice
We start with the results on the whole sample in Table 2, including children who were
already at the upper bound in week 1. We find little effects of either incentive scheme
24Some schools did not have both year two and year five or would only let one of the years participate
in the field experiment.
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on choice overall (Column [1]). The point estimates for competition and the individual
incentive are positive but small and imprecisely estimated. When we break the sample
up by gender and whether a student qualified for a free school meal (FSM)25 we also
find no significant effect: columns [2] and [3] split the sample by gender; columns [4] and
[5] by FSM. However when we look at the results by age in columns [6] and [7] we find
significant results. Column [6] shows that younger children, those in year two, respond
negatively to the individual incentive: students decrease their choice of healthy items by
8% at lunchtime. Furthermore, in the week immediately after the incentive is taken away,
younger students continue to choose less healthy items. This significantly negative effect
does not show up in the overall effect because the older students, those in year five, re-
spond positively to the individual incentive: they choose healthy items 16% more often
than the control group.
Table 2A allows us to test whether the estimates of the effects in Table 2 are signifi-
cantly different by gender, FSM status, and age. As would be expected, when we examine
if the estimates for the individual incentives in column [6] are equal to those in column
[7] we find that they are significantly different; older students respond more positively
to the individual incentive than younger students. The comparisons by gender and FSM
status, though, show no significant difference. Therefore, Tables 2 and 2A show us that
the overall average treatment effect of the individual incentive on choice is masking a
significant heterogeneous effect by age.
Table 2 also allows us to examine if there are differential responses to the treatment
type. At the bottom of Table 2 we present the p-values for whether the estimated effect
from competition equals that of the individual incentive. We find that for two groups -
poorer students and younger students - the competitive incentive works better: students
who qualify for FSM and those in Year 2 choose more healthy items in the competitive
setting. These results carry over to the medium term as well. This suggests competition
may be more effective at getting students to choose healthier items than an individual
based incentive scheme.
When we consider the restricted sample - those who did not choose a fruit or vegetable
every day during the baseline and, thus, have room to improve their nutritional habits -
in Table 3 we find large positive and significant effects for competition in both the short
and medium term but small and imprecise estimates for the individual incentive scheme.
Column [1] shows that the competition increased the probability of choosing a healthy
25Students from poorer households qualify for free school meals. Therefore, to examine the effect of
the treatment on children from poorer socio-economic backgrounds, we break the sample into students
who qualify for FSM and those that do not.
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item by 17.5 percentage points and we find evidence that the effect was sustained to some
extent in week 6, immediately after the incentive is removed, although the size of the
effect is halved to 9.6 percentage points. This means that the competition, roughly, led
to students choosing one more healthy item per week during the intervention and one
more healthy item every two weeks even after the intervention finished. The results for
the individual incentive are positive but not significant in the short term.
Looking at subgroups we find that competition significantly increased the likelihood of
consuming healthy items for nearly everyone (the point estimate for females is large but
not significant). However, the effect of the individual incentive is mixed; there is evidence
males responded positively to the incentive but we again have that younger children
responded negatively and older children responded positively. Therefore, we observe the
same pattern for choice with this sample as we did with the whole sample: there is a stark
heterogeneous effect of the individual incentive by age. However, in this case we have the
fact that the negative effect on younger children carries over into the medium term. The
significance of the heterogeneous effect by age is shown in Table 3A.
When we compare the two treatments, looking at the results at the bottom of Table
3, we find that females and younger students responded significantly more positively to
the competition than then the individual incentive.
These results suggest that competition is working well on incentivising students who
have room to improve their choice of healthier items at lunchtime. While, even for stu-
dents with poorer diets, the individual incentive is causing some groups to choose healthy
items less often. Furthermore the positive effect of competition seems to have a lasting
effect at least into the medium term by causing males and younger students (two key
groups) along with non-FSM students to choose healthier items even after the incentive
has been removed.
Average treatment effects on trying
We now examine our consumption variable that we call “trying” which equals one if a child
ate at least part of a portion of the fruit or vegetable at lunchtime.26 We do not condition
the consumption variable or the regressions on whether a student choose a healthy item.
Therefore the estimates in the tables below show the causal effect of the incentives on
the probability that any given student tries a fruit or vegetable in the short and medium
term.
Table 4 shows the effects on the overall sample, including those at the upper bound at
26We also monitored whether the children at more than half the portion they were served. We report
these in Tables B1 and B2, the results are very similar to what we report for trying.
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baseline. Focusing first on the short term effects, we find that the competitive incentive
scheme increases trying by 11.2 percentage points during the intervention (Column [1]).
We find no evidence of positive effects for the individual incentive scheme. Splitting
by gender and FSM status (columns [2]-[5]) gives a similar picture as the one observed
with choice: we find positive significant effects for the competitive scheme for all groups
except, somewhat notably, males and we do not find significant effects for the individual
incentive scheme. Similarly, when breaking the sample by age, we find positive effects
of the competitive scheme on both subgroups, albeit somewhat imprecisely estimated.
However, for the individual incentive, there are stark differences in the response by age.
Table 4A shows that the differences we find by age are significant for the individual
incentive. We estimate an increase of around 20 percentage points for the Year 5 children
and a decrease of about 7 percentage points for the Year 2 children. These results provide
evidence for Hypothesis 2, but the hypothesis is strongly rejected for young children. We
find little evidence of persistence in week 6, except for girls and Year 2 children in the
competition treatment as well as for Year 2 children in the individual incentive treatment
(the latter being an adverse effect). There is evidence that the competitive incentive led
to a significantly more positive response, both during the period when the incentive was
in place and when the week after it was removed, among females, FSM students, and the
younger children.
Table 5 shows the effects on trying when we restrict the sample (excluding those
bounded upwards in terms of choice behaviour). The results are much larger but similar
in nature to the results reported in Table 4. We find an overall significant increase of
21 percentage points due to the competition intervention and no significant effects of
the individual incentive in the overall sample. Again, the imprecisely estimated positive
effect of the individual incentive masks strong differences in response between younger and
older children, with younger children responding negatively and older children responding
positively. These differential effects by age are significant as seen in Table 5A. While the
differences by age for competition are not significantly different.
We find stronger evidence of persistence once the incentive is removed, at least for the
competitive incentive. Except for girls and Year 5 children, all effects are positive and
significant. They are also quite large in magnitude: overall, the probability of trying a fruit
or vegetable at lunch has increased by 14 percentage points in week 6 for children in the
competition treatment. In contrast, the only persistent effect we find with the individual
incentive is the adverse negative effect on Year 2 children. Comparing the two treatments
we again find that female and younger students respond more to the competitive incentive
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scheme, both during the incentive period and once it had been taken away. This means
that the competitive scheme, on average, caused children to choose and try more than
one additional fruit or vegetable per week both during and after the treatment.
These results provide stark evidence regarding the three hypotheses by incentive
scheme. There is weak and imprecise evidence that the individual incentive increases
choice and consumption of healthy items (Hypotheses 1 and 2). The only significant ev-
idence with regards to the individual incentive regarding Hypothesis 3 (the effect after
the incentive is removed) is that the individual effect appears to have a lasting negative
effect on younger children. Indeed the overall imprecise positive effect of the individual
incentive masks the differential effect that the individual incentive has by age. However,
there is a strong positive evidence that the competitive incentive encourages all students
to choose and consume healthy items (Hypotheses 1 and 2) and that, for most groups,
those effects are present when the incentive is removed (Hypothesis 3). Furthermore males
and FSM students do respond positively to the competitive scheme (unlike under other
interventions) while females, FSM students, and Year 2 students also generally respond
better to the competitive scheme than the individual incentive.
Cost Effectiveness
To understand the implication of these results and what they mean for policy makers we
now want to look at the costs of getting a student to try an additional healthy item under
each scheme. Furthermore we compare the results to one other commonly used interven-
tion to understand how each scheme compare to currently implemented programs.
The prizes for both schemes cost, in total, £3,727 and we had 413 students in the
treatment schools. That means we spent £9 per student over the course of the interven-
tion. When looking at the individual incentive for our group of interest (the less than
100% group) we find that, during the intervention, students increased the likelihood of
trying a fruit or vegetable by 7 percentage points, though, this was imprecisely measured,
and there were no medium term effects. That means that, over the first five weeks of our
experiment (including medium term), students ate 1.5 more healthy items because of the
intervention or, that it cost, roughly, £6 to get a student to eat an additional fruit or
vegetable.
The competition scheme was more effective than the individual scheme; it increased the
likelihood that, for our group of interest, the probability of trying a healthy item increased
by 21 percentage points during the intervention and by 14 percentage points immediately
after the incentive was removed. Thus, for the first five weeks of our experiment students
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ate 5 additional healthy items. That means it cost £1.8 to get a student to eat an
additional healthy item. Looking at the overall sample, competition increased trying by
11 percentage points during the intervention period and 7 percentage points during the
medium term. That means that, with the competition scheme, it costs £3.5 to get an
average student (not just one from our group of interest) to eat an additional fruit or
vegetable.
Are these costs large or small? To determine this we compare the results to the
“Food Dudes” intervention that has been implemented in many countries (e.g. the UK,
Ireland, Italy, and the USA). There have been many experimental studies done showing
the effectiveness of the program but we will focus on the Horne et. al. (2009) study from
Ireland because Ireland is one of the few countries to have released cost data. In Ireland
the Food Dudes program had two main parts: (1) during an intervention period of four
weeks schools provided fruits and vegetables27 and showed six minute videos28 of ‘Food
Dudes’ eating and extolling the virtues of fruit and vegetables to save the world from
the ‘Junk Punks;’ (2) prizes and ‘Food Dude’ lunchboxes were provided for bringing in
and eating fruits and vegetables. The prizes were given out throughout the school year.
According to the Irish government29 implementing the programme for 60,000 children
would cost e658,000 for the prizes and e503,550 for the fruit and vegetables or, roughly,
e20 per student.
Horne et. al. (2009) find that during the intervention period (when food was being
provided) students consumed, roughly 22 grams more of fruits and vegetables per week.
Using the NHS living well proportion of 40g as a measure, this means that, over the nine
month school year, students would have consumed nearly 9.7 more fruits and vegetables
or that it costs at least £1.9 per additional fruit or vegetable consumed. This is a lower
bound as these costs do not include licensing, organizational costs, etc. Indeed the Irish
government puts the cost of the whole program for 60,000 students at over e2 million;
nearly double the costs we are considering here. Therefore the upper bound on costs is
£3.8 per additional fruit or vegetable consumed.
What does this comparison tell us? It shows that our competitive scheme has the
potential to be as cost effective as a commonly used, multifaceted, individual incentive
scheme that had to be augmented by videos, food provision, and teachers taking time
to discuss the goals of the programme.30 Indeed, this implies, that augmenting the com-
27In Ireland, generally, there is no provision of food by schools. Students are expected to bring in a
packed lunch.
28See http://www.fooddudes.co.uk for examples of the videos.
29See “Strategy for School Fruit Scheme” submitted by Ireland for the 2012/2013 school year.
30While our ‘trying’ variable does not equate to the actual eating of fruits and vegetables as examined
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petitive scheme with the same additions that the ‘Food Dudes’ programme uses with its
individual incentive could have even larger results and be more cost effective.
4.4 Choice and Consumption Dynamics
Having established that there are differences in the effectiveness of the incentive schemes
we now move onto explain why it might be the case the competitive scheme appears to
work better in comparison to individual incentive scheme. In this section we will analyse
the dynamics of choice and consumption throughout the week and as such we exclude the
post incentive period. In particular we will look at if there are different dynamics during
the intervention based on the two types of treatments.
First when looking at choice, the children who were most responsive to the treatments
were those who had not chosen a fruit or vegetable 100% of the time during the baseline.
Column [1] in Table 6 shows the effect for that sample of children.31
We find that competition had a large and significant effect on choice during treatment
weeks; children assigned to the competition group were 17 percentage points more likely to
choose a fruit or vegetable. There was a large imprecisely estimated effect due to individual
incentive. Columns [2]-[6] show the effect of the treatments for each day of the week. The
effect of the competitive scheme started off very strong at the beginning of the week;
on Mondays and Tuesdays children were 24 and 25 percentage points, respectively, more
likely to choose a fruit or vegetable. As the week went on the effect dissipated, though;
the point estimate decreased from 18 percentage points on Wednesday to 6 percentage
points on Friday (the latter estimate not being significant). The individual incentive had
the opposite effect; children were more likely to choose their fruit or vegetable at the
end of the week. The only significant increase in choice due to the individual incentive
treatment took place on Friday when children were 27 percentage points more likely to
choose a fruit or vegetable.
In the competitive scheme children did not know how many fruit or vegetables they
would have to choose to get a prize at the end of the week; if they choose five fruit or
vegetables, though, they were guaranteed a prize. Since children did not know who was
in their group and some children did not choose a fruit or vegetable every day, a student
could assign a subjective probability to winning given how many items she had chosen
by Horne et. al. (2009) our ‘eating more than half’ results are likely to be comparable. Those results
would predict the same cost effectiveness as looking at ‘trying’ (refer to tables B1 and B2 in the appendix).
31There was no effect - either positive or negative - on the sample of children that had chosen a healthy
item 100% of the time during the baseline week. The effect on all children is just a weighted average of
these two groups.
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during the week.32 Based on a student’s subjective probability one could calculate the
number of fruit or vegetables that a student would ideally want to consume each week to
maximise her benefit from getting a prize subject to her disutility from having to choose
a fruit or vegetable. Once a student has reached that number of fruit or vegetables she
could switch back to her preferred unhealthy item. This type of pattern would explain
why the effect of competition tapered off during the week.
In the individual scheme the threshold to obtain the weekly prize was known and
fixed. Given the exogenous pre-determined goal a student had to reach there was room
for discouragement to take place; if a student had not eaten a fruit or vegetable on
Monday and Tuesday then there was zero probability the student would get a prize that
week. Besides having no external incentive from Wednesday onwards, a student might
also feel discouraged and choose not to select a healthy option. Therefore, to examine this
discouragement effect we break the sample into two groups in columns [7] and [8]. Column
[7] contains children who had ‘missed’ the prize as of Wednesday, i.e. they had not chosen
a fruit or vegetable on Monday and Tuesday. Column [8] contains those children who had
chosen at least one fruit or vegetable before Wednesday. The effect of individual incentive
is large and significant for those who still have a chance of getting a prize, i.e. those in
column [8]. However, for those that have missed the chance of getting a prize the effect
of individual incentive is estimated to be negative, though, it is insignificant. This means
that as the week goes on the incentive to choose a fruit or vegetable wears off for those
that miss the goal in the individual incentive scheme. However, this is not the case in the
competition treatment because there is always a positive probability of winning the prize
no matter how many items the student has consumed during the week.33
These results speak to the intrinsic incentive differences between the two treatments.
The external, known goal in the individual scheme can lead to a lack of incentive because
of previous choice patterns. However, there is always a positive chance of winning in
the competition treatment because the goal is unknown and endogenous to the system.
In the habit formation literature with regards to healthy eating the goals have all been
exogenous and known. Therefore, there is room to design rewards like the competitive
scheme that can have a greater effect (than an individual scheme) over the same period
32In fact there was an increasing probability of winning the prize based on the number of healthy items
one chose. There was a small probability (under 5%) chance of winning if a student had chosen zero or
one item, a 6.7% chance of winning if a student chose two items, a 21% chance of winning if a student
chose three items, and a 39% chance of winning if a student chose 4 items.
33Indeed we cannot reject that the point estimates for competition are the same in columns [7] and
[8] showing that the choice pattern before Wednesday does not change the effect that the competition
treatment has from Wednesday onwards. However we can reject that the point estimates in columns [7]
and [8] are the same in the individual incentive scheme.
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of time.
The effect of the competitive scheme on consuming at least part of a fruit or vegetable
is similar to what we found for choice. Table 7, Columns [2]-[6] shows again a large
positive effect of competition that is relatively constant but drops off slightly on Friday.
The individual incentive only has a significant effect on Friday, and again when comparing
children who missed the chance to win a prize and those who are still eligible (columns
[7] and [8]), we find that the individual incentive has a positive significant effect only for
the latter group. Also, the point estimate for competition is not significantly different
between columns [7] and [8]. This means that previous choice patterns in the week do
not effect consumption choices later in the week systematically, unlike for the individual
incentive treatment.
Summarising, we find that each incentive scheme is associated with different dynamics
of choice and consumption behaviour. The competition works throughout the week, while
the individual incentive only has an end-of-the-week effect. This effect is particularly
pronounced for children who still have the chance to win a prize, while it is basically zero
for those who know they have already forgone the chance to win a prize by Wednesday.
These differences is choice and consumption are, thus, likely due to the way the goals
are defined; the known constant goal of the individual incentive causing discouragement
and the unknown endogenous goal of the competitive treatment providing at least some
positive incentive to choose a healthy item every day.
4.5 Long term effects
To evaluate whether the effects we find lead to permanent changes in habits, we contacted
the schools again 6 months later and asked them to conduct an additional week of mon-
itoring; 21 out of the 31 schools agreed to conduct an additional week of monitoring.34
To get at the longer run effects we redid the analysis presented in the section 4.3 on that
selected sample only. In creating those tables we included an additional interaction term
of the treatment with an indicator denoting 6 months later. For brevity, in Tables 8
(choice) and 9 (trying), we only present this additional interaction term. In both tables
panel A shows is for the overall sample and panel B is for the restricted sample.
34To be sure that the sample used for the long-term analysis is not a positively selected sample (of
schools that have had a positive experience with the incentive schemes in particular) we ran the previous
analysis on the subset of 21 schools to check the selection. The results are very similar in nature to the
ones found with the whole sample (Tables 2 - 5), so we are confident that the long-term results are not
driven by selection. We also recreated the descriptive table, Table 1, and found similar results, i.e. no
significant differences between treatments and control or the treatments. The results are not reported
here but are available upon request.
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We find little evidence of any persistence 6 months later on the overall sample or in
the restricted sample. In Table 8 for choice, the largest positive point estimates for both
samples occur for the free school meal registered pupils in the competition scheme (column
[4]). However, this is a small group and the estimates are imprecise. We do not find any
significant differences across groups and only one significant difference across treatments;
the wild p-value is not significant for any estimate, though. Turning to trying in Table
9, again the largest point estimates we find are for the free school registered group, but
again they imprecisely estimated. We do find a significant difference for the overall sample
(Panel A) between the treatments for the year 5 pupils. With the individual incentive
scheme having a larger effect than in the long run than the competitive scheme. We also
find a significant estimate for FSM students in the less than 100% group for the individual
incentive scheme. However, given the wild p-value for the estimate is 0.651 and that the
individual incentive scheme never had a significant effect or a positive point estimate
above 0.027 for FSM students in the previous analysis, this estimate does not provide any
strong evidence for a longer term effect. Overall, we find little, if any, evidence for long
run effects as a result of either of the treatments. This means there is little evidence for
Hypothesis 3 with regards to the longer term.
4.6 Learning: Food Knowledge
One question is whether the intervention triggered a response only through the incentives,
or also through learning. It could be that the intervention taught children that fruit
and vegetables are healthy and that they respond to that information rather than the
incentives. We are able to test for this possibility by comparing the results on a knowledge
test that was conducted just before and at the end of the intervention. The test shows
pictures of seven food items, including three or four fruit or vegetables and unhealthy
items (such as sweets, chips, ice cream, crisps, fish fingers). On the test children were
asked to identify what the item was and whether the item was healthy or not (see Figure
A2 for an example). On average, we find that children described 92% items correctly as
healthy or not and were able to identify 83% of the items correctly before the intervention.
We estimate a simple linear model with the change in the test score of identifying
items correctly as the dependent variable and include indicators for the two treatment
groups. The results are presented in Table 10 for the whole sample and in Table 11 for the
sample of children who chose less than 100% in the first week. The effects across group are
not consistent and we fail to find evidence that the scores improved more in the treated
schools than in the control schools. If anything, we find negative effects for the children
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in the individual incentive group (restricted sample). We only find a positive significant
effect for the Year 5 children in the competition treatment. These results indicate that
knowledge was very high before the intervention and that the positive effects we find on
choice and trying are not due to improvement in knowledge. Children know very well
that fruit and vegetables are healthy and we can safely rule out the hypothesis that the
responses to the intervention are driven by learning.
4.7 Effects on other outcomes
An additional exercise we propose is to check whether the interventions affected other
relevant outcomes that could partially explain the treatment effects we found. These
results are reported in Appendix B.
A first outcome of interest is attendance. One concern could be that the prospect of
receiving (or not) a reward may affect attendance rates. We investigate this possibility in
Tables B3 and B4. Table B3 reports results for the whole sample, while Table B4 reports
results for the less than 100% sample). We do not find any significant effect on attendance
overall or by sub-group. We do find positive and significant effects on attendance for males
in the individual incentive scheme for the restricted sample. However, in the main results
we do not find positive and significant effects of the individual incentive for boys when
looking at either choice or try. Thus, these effects appear to be difficult to reconcile with
the treatment effects we found. We conclude that changes in attendance rates are unlikely
to drive the treatment effects on choice and consumption.
A second outcome that seems worth considering is whether children are more or less
likely to bring a packed lunch as a result of the intervention. This would not be a
confounding factor though. But it would provide some information regarding how children
adjusted to the introduction of the incentive schemes. For example, students may have
put pressure on their parents to provide a packed lunch if they do not like the fruits or
vegetables on offer at school. Table B5 and B6 report the results. We find no evidence
that children were more or less likely to bring a packed lunch overall. In the restricted
sample, we find a positive and significant effect for males in the competitive scheme for
week 6 but not while the intervention is actually taking place. This means that the
treatment effects we find are driven by children changing their behaviour within the meal
context they started with (packed lunch or school meal).
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5. Conclusion
This paper provides field evidence on how two incentive scheme change how children
choose and consume healthy items at lunchtime. We conducted a large scale field exper-
iment in 31 primary schools in England testing for the effects of two different incentive
schemes: a competition and an individual incentive scheme. Both schemes lasted 4 weeks
and we monitored choice and consumption of healthy items by children made over that
period, as well as one week before, one week after and 6 months later.
We find two main results. First, competitive and individual incentives have very
different effects and one cannot draw a unique conclusion on whether incentives work
or not. The competitive incentive is overall more effective and more robust. Children
respond positively to the competition and increase their choice and consumption of fruit
and vegetables. The individual incentive, in contrast, has very heterogeneous effects.
Older children respond positively, while younger children are affected negatively. Second,
we do find evidence that the intervention continues to affect behaviour after the incentives
are removed. However, we find little evidence of behaviour change six months later; the
effects of the temporary incentive appear to be short lived.
Overall our results show the need to study various forms of incentive schemes as it
is not clear that incentives will work in the same way for different subgroups of the
population. In particular, an exogenous, know incentive can lead some groups to become
discouraged. In terms of policy implications, our findings suggest that the competitive
incentive is more effective overall, while the individual incentive can have adverse effects
on some subgroups of children. But we also advocate for more research, particularly using
field experiments, to investigate in more detail how incentive schemes work and for whom.
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Figures & Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics Control and Treatment Groups
Control Individual Comp. Ctrl vs Ctrl Vs Comp Vs
Ind Comp Ind
(C) (T1) (T2) C vs T1 C vs T2 T1 vs T2
Panel A: All Pupils
Choice 0.841 0.847 0.821 0.925 0.769 0.713
Try 0.739 0.769 0.72 0.721 0.815 0.599
Eat more than half 0.554 0.618 0.614 0.352 0.571 0.985
Female % 0.513 0.438 0.558 0.188 0.414 0.040
English first language 0.977 0.983 0.931 0.945 0.244 0.152
White British 0.905 0.926 0.805 0.771 0.322 0.254
Year 2 0.5 0.537 0.619 0.835 0.286 0.647
Free School Meal % 0.206 0.197 0.154 0.901 0.406 0.515
School Dinner % 0.52 0.453 0.479 0.539 0.699 0.795
Packed Lunch % 0.479 0.547 0.521 0.531 0.671 0.795
Special dietary requirements % 0.053 0.097 0.128 0.162 0.132 0.699
Specific health cond. % 0.144 0.167 0.161 0.561 0.585 0.887
Ofsted overall score 2.066 1.875 2.206 0.418 0.569 0.244
Ofsted health score 1.396 1.536 1.424 0.633 0.971 0.667
Per pupil expenditure 4097 4126 3816 0.941 0.370 0.280
Catering costs 112.1 94.1 62.6 0.573 0.236 0.336
Food for life status 0.205 0.395 0.173 0.364 0.815 0.292
Headcount girls 106.4 122.1 122.8 0.667 0.362 0.979
Headcount boys 114.3 138.0 131.2 0.625 0.358 0.875
Average point score 0.288 0.28 0.283 0.144 0.272 0.731
Achieving Level 4 or > in Eng/Maths 0.815 0.789 0.751 0.607 0.200 0.571
Persistent Absence 0.024 0.017 0.021 0.671 0.831 0.693
Absence 0.054 0.051 0.054 0.569 0.959 0.677
Panel B: Restricted sample (Chose less than 100% Choice in baseline week)
Choice 0.545 0.515 0.477 0.735 0.464 0.639
Try 0.455 0.458 0.375 0.977 0.388 0.300
Eat more than half 0.329 0.356 0.323 0.715 0.929 0.675
Female 0.396 0.419 0.575 0.769 0.064 0.084
1st Language English 0.961 0.965 0.946 0.889 0.777 0.659
White British 0.854 0.944 0.784 0.262 0.617 0.202
Year 2 0.382 0.303 0.624 0.771 0.048 0.348
Free School Meal % 0.154 0.102 0.162 0.635 0.947 0.533
School Dinner % 0.441 0.371 0.558 0.729 0.452 0.302
Packed Lunch % 0.556 0.629 0.442 0.723 0.456 0.302
Special dietary requirements % 0.028 0.108 0.177 0.104 0.072 0.350
Specific health cond. % 0.179 0.228 0.128 0.625 0.482 0.236
Ofsted overall score 2.169 2.079 2.263 0.613 0.759 0.422
Ofsted health score 1.346 1.485 1.468 0.815 0.749 0.965
Per pupil expenditure 3727 3919 3743 0.282 1.009 0.521
Catering costs 84.2 77.1 40.5 0.823 0.112 0.188
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – Continued from previous page
Control Individual Comp. Ctrl vs Ctrl Vs Comp Vs
Ind Comp Ind
(C) (T1) (T2) C vs T1 C vs T2 T1 vs T2
Food for life status 0.244 0.062 0.124 0.545 0.667 0.675
Headcount girls 111.1 120.0 119.1 0.603 0.671 0.947
Headcount boys 116.3 133.2 127.5 0.434 0.595 0.773
Average point score 0.287 0.289 0.283 0.677 0.306 0.156
Achieving Level 4 or > in Eng/Maths 0.838 0.827 0.752 0.813 0.152 0.138
Persistent Absence 0.017 0.011 0.018 0.667 0.847 0.482
Absence 0.052 0.047 0.053 0.539 0.915 0.490
notes: All variables are evaluated for the first week, before the start of the treatment. The first column shows the
means for the pupils in the control school in the, the second column for schools in the individual incentive scheme
and the third column in the competition schools. The fourth and fifth columns show the p-value difference in the
means of each treatment compared to the control group. The p-value were calculated, to account for intra-school
correlation, by regressing each baseline variable on one of the treatment indicators, standard errors are clustered at
the school level and due to the small number clusters we present wild bootstrapped p-values using 1000 replications
which are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008), the p-value is matched to the t-statistic on the
treatment dummy.
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Figure 1: Proportion of students choosing a healthy item
a) Full Sample
a) Sample with less than 100% Choice in Baseline
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Figure 2: Proportion of students trying a healthy item
a) Full Sample
a) Sample with less than 100% Choice in Baseline
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Table 2: Effect on Choice for Overall Sample and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Chose a Healthy Item
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.045 0.059 0.026 0.071 0.045 0.057 0.023
(0.031) (0.036) (0.049) (0.065) (0.032) (0.043) (0.048)
[0.180] [0.144] [0.739] [0.352] [0.164] [0.246] [0.667]
Competition (=1) * Week 6 0.001 0.027 -0.030 0.002 0.003 0.040 -0.051
(0.034) (0.044) (0.029) (0.100) (0.029) (0.033) (0.065)
[0.955] [0.595] [0.390] [1.00] [0.889] [0.294] [0.492]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.024 0.010 0.037 -0.033 0.033 -0.066** 0.126*
(0.050) (0.045) (0.061) (0.052) (0.053) (0.027) (0.072)
[0.659] [0.863] [0.549] [0.537] [0.515] [0.034] [0.236]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 -0.045 -0.045 -0.051 -0.164 -0.027 -0.122*** 0.048
(0.059) (0.058) (0.063) (0.114) (0.059) (0.036) (0.083)
[0.567] [0.450] [0.486] [0.166] [0.701] [0.004] [0.641]
Constant 0.821*** 0.843*** 0.798*** 0.838*** 0.819*** 0.852*** 0.788***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.021) (0.015) (0.013) (0.022)
Sample All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 0.698 0.278 0.875 0.088 0.837 0.012 0.198
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 (wild) 0.711 0.276 0.809 0.108 0.859 0.020 0.340
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 6 0.415 0.218 0.733 0.071 0.606 0.000 0.273
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 6 (wild) 0.396 0.222 0.755 0.068 0.627 0.002 0.364
Observations 15,338 7,986 7,352 2,664 12,256 8,033 7,305
R-squared 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.021 0.006 0.011 0.014
Number of pupils 638 328 310 114 509 343 295
notes: Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values
are shown in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008) using 1000 replications. Column [2] includes only female and
column [3] contains only males. Column [4] includes only students who are eligible for free school meals (FSM) and column [5] contains those
students not eligible for FSM; there are 15 students for whom we are missing FSM status. Column [6] contains only students in Year 2 and column
[7] contains only students in Year 5.
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Table 2A: Tests for Differences Between Subgroups
Column Column Column
[2] = [3] [4] = [5] [6] = [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.577 0.686 0.611
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 (wild-p) 0.595 0.681 0.687
Competition (=1) * Week 6 0.164 0.985 0.216
Competition (=1) * Week 6 (wild-p) 0.186 1.019 0.240
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.543 0.316 0.020
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 (wild-p) 0.571 0.316 0.076
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 0.871 0.269 0.067
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 (wild-p) 0.893 0.322 0.132
First Group in Column Heading Female FSM Year 2
Second Group in Column Heading Male Non-FSM Year 5
notes: The table contains the p-values for the tests of whether the coefficient on the variables in Table 2 for
the two columns listed are equal. Wild p-values shown are estimated following Cameron, Gelbrach, Miller
(2008) using 1000 replications.
36
Table 3: Effect on Choice for Sample with Week 1 less than 100% Choice and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Chose a Healthy Item
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.175*** 0.108 0.214*** 0.256* 0.165*** 0.157* 0.160**
(0.060) (0.081) (0.073) (0.131) (0.057) (0.076) (0.068)
[0.018] [0.302] [0.002] [0.112] [0.016] [0.176] [0.042]
Competition (=1) * Week 6 0.096** 0.058 0.111** 0.085 0.094** 0.110* 0.060
(0.043) (0.064) (0.053) (0.152) (0.037) (0.057) (0.068)
[0.048] [0.370] [0.126] [0.723] [0.020] [0.174] [0.456]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.096 -0.014 0.173* 0.027 0.088 -0.194*** 0.231***
(0.080) (0.095) (0.095) (0.188) (0.071) (0.068) (0.076)
[0.340] [0.871] [0.260] [0.847] [0.382] [0.108] [0.032]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 -0.035 -0.104 0.010 -0.298 -0.023 -0.389*** 0.109
(0.094) (0.086) (0.116) (0.351) (0.084) (0.068) (0.082)
[0.687] [0.200] [0.961] [0.727] [0.765] [0.000] [0.212]
Constant 0.517*** 0.540*** 0.495*** 0.459*** 0.527*** 0.511*** 0.523***
(0.024) (0.026) (0.030) (0.054) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
Sample All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 0.371 0.170 0.721 0.260 0.348 0.000 0.383
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 (wild) 0.428 0.168 0.755 0.490 0.346 0.014 0.468
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 6 0.191 0.069 0.426 0.288 0.189 0.000 0.559
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 6 (wild) 0.204 0.050 0.436 0.639 0.182 0.000 0.593
Observations 5,586 2,641 2,945 802 4,587 2,369 3,217
R-squared 0.054 0.067 0.046 0.089 0.047 0.065 0.061
Number of pupils 215 102 113 29 179 93 122
notes: Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values
are shown in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008) using 1000 replications. Column [2] includes only female and
column [3] contains only males. Column [4] includes only students who are eligible for free school meals (FSM) and column [5] contains those
students not eligible for FSM; there are 15 students for whom we are missing FSM status. Column [6] contains only students in Year 2 and column
[7] contains only students in Year 5.
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Table 3A: Tests for Differences Between Subgroups
Column Column Column
[2] = [3] [4] = [5] [6] = [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.240 0.456 0.972
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 (wild-p) 0.276 0.573 0.911
Competition (=1) * Week 6 0.473 0.951 0.570
Competition (=1) * Week 6 (wild-p) 0.529 0.907 0.637
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.072 0.729 0.000
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 (wild-p) 0.154 0.733 0.002
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 0.205 0.444 0.000
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 (wild-p) 0.252 0.611 0.002
First Group in Column Heading Female FSM Year 2
Second Group in Column Heading Male Non-FSM Year 5
notes: The table contains the p-values for the tests of whether the coefficient on the variables in Table 2 for
the two columns listed are equal. Wild p-values shown are estimated following Cameron, Gelbrach, Miller
(2008) using 1000 replications.
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Table 4: Effect on Trying for Overall Sample and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Tried a Healthy Item
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.112** 0.142*** 0.073 0.195** 0.099** 0.116* 0.105*
(0.049) (0.051) (0.069) (0.088) (0.047) (0.059) (0.054)
[0.022] [0.012] [0.456] [0.080] [0.036] [0.084] [0.114]
Competition (=1) * Week 6 0.067 0.099* 0.027 0.156 0.050 0.097* 0.032
(0.050) (0.052) (0.062) (0.107) (0.043) (0.047) (0.069)
[0.210] [0.110] [0.799] [0.260] [0.282] [0.070] [0.671]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.033 0.021 0.042 -0.024 0.043 -0.073* 0.199***
(0.058) (0.053) (0.077) (0.080) (0.059) (0.041) (0.066)
[0.587] [0.707] [0.623] [0.763] [0.557] [0.124] [0.0961]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 -0.025 -0.025 -0.028 -0.125 -0.012 -0.121** 0.130
(0.072) (0.069) (0.085) (0.131) (0.068) (0.044) (0.096)
[0.869] [0.723] [0.753] [0.386] [0.855] [0.016] [0.282]
Constant 0.736*** 0.760*** 0.711*** 0.759*** 0.734*** 0.769*** 0.692***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.026) (0.028) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022)
Sample All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 0.251 0.041 0.730 0.010 0.418 0.002 0.247
wild P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 0.286 0.068 0.807 0.020 0.464 0.002 0.378
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 6 0.164 0.054 0.484 0.012 0.323 0.000 0.256
wild P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 6 0.220 0.080 0.565 0.016 0.326 0.000 0.328
Observations 14,714 7,719 6,994 2,495 11,838 7,916 6,798
R-squared 0.012 0.018 0.008 0.026 0.011 0.015 0.023
Number of pupils 638 328 310 114 509 343 295
notes: Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values
are shown in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008) using 1000 replications. Column [2] includes only female and
column [3] contains only males. Column [4] includes only students who are eligible for free school meals (FSM) and column [5] contains those
students not eligible for FSM; there are 15 students for whom we are missing FSM status. Column [6] contains only students in Year 2 and column
[7] contains only students in Year 5.
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Table 4A: Tests for Differences Between Subgroups
Column Column Column
[2] = [3] [4] = [5] [6] = [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.324 0.204 0.831
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 (wild-p) 0.376 0.284 0.847
Competition (=1) * Week 6 0.229 0.202 0.299
Competition (=1) * Week 6 (wild-p) 0.248 0.316 0.338
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.745 0.437 0.001
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 (wild-p) 0.775 0.452 0.020
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 0.965 0.364 0.012
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 (wild-p) 0.969 0.378 0.068
First Group in Column Heading Female FSM Year 2
Second Group in Column Heading Male Non-FSM Year 5
notes: The table contains the p-values for the tests of whether the coefficient on the variables in Table 2 for
the two columns listed are equal. Wild p-values shown are estimated following Cameron, Gelbrach, Miller
(2008) using 1000 replications.
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Table 5: Effect on Try for Sample with Week 1 less than 100% Choice and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Tried a Healthy Item
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.211*** 0.158** 0.235** 0.275** 0.198*** 0.171* 0.210***
(0.066) (0.073) (0.086) (0.097) (0.067) (0.086) (0.066)
[0.002] [0.072] [0.008] [0.050] [0.004] [0.094] [0.002]
Competition (=1) * Week 6 0.141** 0.101 0.154** 0.196** 0.120** 0.170*** 0.090
(0.054) (0.080) (0.059) (0.088) (0.051) (0.057) (0.073)
[0.002] [0.220] [0.042] [0.058] [0.022] [0.008] [0.260]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.074 -0.023 0.140 0.019 0.074 -0.265*** 0.245***
(0.078) (0.079) (0.105) (0.192) (0.072) (0.056) (0.050)
[0.364] [0.821] [0.374] [0.879] [0.414] [0.008] [0.008]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 -0.020 -0.081 0.018 -0.140 -0.026 -0.352*** 0.123
(0.095) (0.091) (0.119) (0.322) (0.091) (0.057) (0.081)
[0.788] [0.454] [0.915] [0.727] [0.791] [0.006] [0.176]
Constant 0.436*** 0.458*** 0.414*** 0.357*** 0.449*** 0.416*** 0.452***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.032) (0.043) (0.024) (0.027) (0.021)
Sample All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wks 2-5 0.167 0.067 0.463 0.239 0.192 0.000 0.662
wild P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 0.188 0.092 0.527 0.484 0.206 0.004 0.743
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wk 6 0.117 0.047 0.301 0.322 0.126 0.000 0.715
wild P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 6 0.134 0.038 0.326 0.521 0.098 0.000 0.779
Observations 5,466 2,583 2,883 799 4,476 2,360 3,106
R-squared 0.066 0.083 0.053 0.107 0.058 0.083 0.070
Number of pupils 215 102 113 29 179 93 122
notes: Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values
are shown in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008) using 1000 replications. Column [2] includes only female and
column [3] contains only males. Column [4] includes only students who are eligible for free school meals (FSM) and column [5] contains those
students not eligible for FSM; there are 15 students for whom we are missing FSM status. Column [6] contains only students in Year 2 and column
[7] contains only students in Year 5.
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Table 5A: Tests for Differences Between Subgroups
Column Column Column
[2] = [3] [4] = [5] [6] = [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.362 0.444 0.608
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 (wild-p) 0.360 0.468 0.679
Competition (=1) * Week 6 0.528 0.441 0.292
Competition (=1) * Week 6 (wild-p) 0.601 0.513 0.324
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.139 0.768 0.000
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 (wild-p) 0.280 0.765 0.000
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 0.322 0.727 0.000
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 (wild-p) 0.362 0.695 0.000
First Group in Column Heading Female FSM Year 2
Second Group in Column Heading Male Non-FSM Year 5
notes: The table contains the p-values for the tests of whether the coefficient on the variables in Table 2 for
the two columns listed are equal. Wild p-values shown are estimated following Cameron, Gelbrach, Miller
(2008) using 1000 replications.
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Table 6: Effects on Choice Over Treatment Weeks on Sample with Week 1 less than 100% Choice
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Chose a Healthy Item
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.172*** 0.243*** 0.251* 0.177* 0.151 0.057 0.043 0.112
(0.061) (0.047) (0.135) (0.100) (0.113) (0.097) (0.085) (0.093)
[0.024] [0.002] [0.150] [0.156] [0.236] [0.607] [0.649] [0.330]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.099 0.033 0.056 0.073 0.064 0.266** -0.044 0.176**
(0.079) (0.067) (0.133) (0.102) (0.127) (0.115) (0.200) (0.064)
[0.336] [0.643] [0.785] [0.557] [0.663] [0.254] [0.799] [0.162]
Constant 0.477*** 0.440*** 0.562*** 0.587*** 0.564*** 0.431*** 0.327*** 0.546***
(0.018) (0.027) (0.041) (0.033) (0.042) (0.039) (0.050) (0.038)
Days of the Week Used Mon-Fri Mon Tue Wed Thur Fri Wed-Fri Wed-Fri
Sample Used All All All All All All Missed Not Missed
Day of Week Controls Yes No No No No No Yes Yes
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive 0.402 0.006 0.084 0.368 0.608 0.148 0.664 0.557
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive (wild) 0.432 0.016 0.084 0.384 0.621 0.348 0.677 0.661
Observations 4,745 910 977 952 975 931 876 1,982
R-squared 0.060 0.103 0.049 0.050 0.068 0.092 0.029 0.080
Number of pupils 215 212 214 215 213 213 158 202
notes: Robust Standard Errors clustered at the school level are in brackets; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are
shown in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008) using 1000 replications. The sample used in this regression
are children who did not try at least some of a healthy option 100% of the time during the baseline week. The ”Missed” sample in column [7]
includes only those children who had not eaten any healthy times on Monday and Tuesday of the given week. The ”Not Missed” sample in
column [8] includes only those children who had eaten at least one healthy item on Monday or Tuesday during the given week.
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Table 7: Effects on Try Over the Week During Treatment on Sample with Week 1 less than 100% Choice
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Chose a Healthy Item
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.212*** 0.243** 0.241** 0.223 0.224** 0.132 0.120 0.182
(0.069) (0.097) (0.100) (0.136) (0.104) (0.079) (0.110) (0.111)
[0.006] [0.038] [0.068] [0.162] [0.084] [0.160] [0.346] [0.192]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.075 0.006 -0.060 0.047 0.121 0.240* -0.044 0.185**
(0.077) (0.104) (0.091) (0.086) (0.145) (0.137) (0.201) (0.073)
[0.342] [0.955] [0.569] [0.595] [0.547] [0.348] [0.873] [0.242]
Constant 0.393*** 0.341*** 0.460*** 0.497*** 0.490*** 0.392*** 0.223*** 0.589***
(0.023) (0.031) (0.034) (0.043) (0.042) (0.037) (0.045) (0.042)
Days of the Week Used Mon-Fri Mon Tue Wed Thur Fri Wed-Fri Wed-Fri
Sample Used All All All All All All Missed Not Missed
Day of Week Controls Yes No No No No No Yes Yes
P-value for Competition=Individual 0.176 0.002 0.020 0.241 0.552 0.489 0.435 0.984
P-value for Competition=Individual (wild) 0.204 0.006 0.026 0.292 0.591 0.595 0.490 1.007
Observations 4,639 884 944 935 956 920 887 1,924
R-squared 0.074 0.128 0.074 0.069 0.080 0.083 0.035 0.081
Number of pupils 215 211 213 215 212 213 157 203
notes: Robust Standard Errors clustered at the school level are in brackets; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are
shown in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008) using 1000 replications. The sample used in this regression
are children who did not try at least some of a healthy option 100% of the time during the baseline week. The ”Missed” sample in column [7]
includes only those children who had not eaten any healthy times on Monday and Tuesday of the given week. The ”Not Missed” sample in
column [8] includes only those children who had eaten at least one healthy item on Monday or Tuesday during the given week.
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Table 8: Long Run Effect on Choice for Overall Sample and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Tried a Healthy Item
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Panel A: Choice
Competition (=1) * 6 months later -0.058 -0.018 -0.104 0.045 -0.084* -0.027 -0.102
(0.057) (0.055) (0.069) (0.127) (0.047) (0.057) (0.097)
[0.358] [0.731] [0.250] [0.725] [0.149] [0.615] [0.356]
Individual Incentive (=1) * 6 months later -0.016 -0.004 -0.035 -0.121 -0.015 -0.081 0.035
(0.070) (0.053) (0.091) (0.133) (0.067) (0.060) (0.100)
[0.853] [0.490] [0.350] [0.629] [0.416] [0.150] [1.38]
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive 6 Months 0.492 0.806 0.360 0.0943 0.298 0.414 0.105
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive 6 Months (wild) 0.496 0.851 0.388 0.154 0.374 0.464 0.182
Observations 11,630 6,045 5,585 2,125 9,092 5,575 6,055
R-squared 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.023 0.014 0.012 0.023
Number of pupils 392 204 188 68 311 195 197
Panel B: Choice < 100% Choice in Week 1
Competition (=1) * 6 months later 0.055 0.089 0.020 0.237 0.009 0.042 0.044
(0.104) (0.100) (0.127) (0.258) (0.075) (0.099) (0.148)
[0.629] [0.394] [0.923] [0.432] [0.903] [0.677] [0.775]
Individual Incentive (=1) * 6 months later 0.017 -0.015 0.037 0.078 -0.010 -0.040 0.044
(0.066) (0.064) (0.082) (0.186) (0.061) (0.138) (0.110)
[0.853] [0.913] [0.749] [0.593] [0.987] [0.787] [0.793]
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive 6 Months 0.695 0.297 0.888 0.402 0.825 0.625 0.996
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive 6 Months (wild) 0.753 0.406 0.885 0.424 0.847 0.659 1.027
Sample All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
Observations 5,072 2,321 2,751 679 4,197 1,794 3,278
R-squared 0.051 0.058 0.052 0.108 0.044 0.065 0.055
Number of pupils 168 78 90 21 141 62 106
notes: Robust Standard Errors clustered at the school level are in brackets; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are
shown in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008) using 1000 replications.
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Table 8A: Tests for Differences Between Subgroups
Column Column Column
[2] = [3] [4] = [5] [6] = [7]
Competition (=1) * 6 months later 0.152 0.223 0.490
Competition (=1) * 6 months later (wild-p) 0.206 0.282 0.484
Individual Incentive (=1) * 6 months later 0.601 0.406 0.332
Individual Incentive (=1) * 6 months later (wild-p) 0.587 0.478 0.448
First Group in Column Heading Female FSM Year 2
Second Group in Column Heading Male Non-FSM Year 5
notes: The table contains the p-values for the tests of whether the coefficient on the variables in Table 2 for
the two columns listed are equal. Wild p-values shown are estimated following Cameron, Gelbrach, Miller
(2008).
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Table 9: Long Run Effect on Try for Overall Sample and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Tried a Healthy Item
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Panel A: Try
Competition (=1) * 6 months later -0.030 -0.009 -0.057 0.142 -0.072 -0.038 -0.022
(0.079) (0.059) (0.113) (0.151) (0.061) (0.067) (0.107)
[0.697] [0.827] [0.649] [0.370] [0.354] [0.639] [0.885]
Individual Incentive (=1) * 6 months later -0.019 -0.017 -0.023 -0.023 -0.049 -0.118 0.099
(0.092) (0.067) (0.127) (0.172) (0.080) (0.076) (0.111)
[0.819] [0.366] [0.551] [0.905] [0.358] [0.126] [1.089]
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive 6 Months 0.867 0.899 0.679 0.162 0.727 0.244 0.006
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive 6 Months (wild) 0.875 0.911 0.681 0.168 0.759 0.304 0.010
Observations 11,021 5,796 5,224 1,974 8,673 5,504 5,517
R-squared 0.016 0.018 0.013 0.018 0.019 0.012 0.033
Number of pupils 392 204 188 68 311 195 197
Panel B: Try and <100% choice in baseline week
Competition (=1) * 6 months later 0.029 0.020 0.035 0.159 -0.010 -0.006 0.036
(0.110) (0.108) (0.129) (0.175) (0.091) (0.106) (0.157)
[0.779] [0.829] [0.827] [0.434] [0.903] [0.981] [0.829]
Individual Incentive (=1) * 6 months later -0.030 -0.060 -0.015 0.119* -0.060 -0.130 0.023
(0.074) (0.080) (0.086) (0.061) (0.081) (0.125) (0.113)
[0.817] [0.607] [0.889] [0.651] [0.585] [0.432] [0.873]
Sample All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive 6 Months 0.547 0.412 0.693 0.809 0.582 0.406 0.907
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive 6 Months (wild) 0.523 0.513 0.711 0.817 0.581 0.468 0.913
Observations 4,944 2,258 2,686 678 4,076 1,793 3,151
R-squared 0.057 0.066 0.052 0.110 0.051 0.070 0.062
Number of pupils 168 78 90 21 141 62 106
notes: Robust Standard Errors clustered at the school level are in brackets; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are
shown in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008) using 1000 replications.
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Table 10: Food Knowledge
Dependent Variable: Change in Food knowledge Test Score
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) -0.041 -0.047 -0.035 -0.115** -0.025 -0.059 -0.019
(0.031) (0.040) (0.051) (0.052) (0.034) (0.048) (0.028)
[0.230] [0.256] [0.589] [0.076] [0.521] [0.204] [0.551]
Individual Incentive (=1) -0.018 -0.045 -0.005 0.005 -0.017 0.015 -0.048
(0.041) (0.053) (0.057) (0.061) (0.041) (0.062) (0.043)
[0.739] [0.442] [0.959] [0.875] [0.663] [0.851] [0.374]
Constant 0.045 0.038 0.055 0.109*** 0.028 0.049 0.039
(0.026) (0.033) (0.048) (0.030) (0.029) (0.037) (0.027)
1st Test Score 0.827 0.852 0.798 0.754 0.843 0.806 0.853
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.022 0.008 0.038 0.061 0.013 0.024 0.020
Sample All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 0.516 0.965 0.388 0.093 0.818 0.220 0.418
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 (wild) 0.507 1.003 0.426 0.172 0.801 0.234 0.494
Observations 302 162 140 45 247 164 138
R-squared 0.007 0.011 0.005 0.065 0.002 0.017 0.008
notes: Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values
are shown in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008) using 1000 replications.
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Table 11: Food Knowledge on Sample with Week 1 less than 100% Choice
Dependent Variable: Change in Food knowledge Test Score
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) -0.011 -0.032 0.017 -0.133 -0.003 -0.113 0.061***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.074) (0.182) (0.044) (0.097) (0.018)
[0.793] [0.428] [0.897] [0.579] [0.945] [0.226] [0.020]
Individual Incentive (=1) -0.012 -0.076* 0.035 -0.103*** -0.017 0.044 -0.023*
(0.038) (0.038) (0.063) (0.009) (0.044) (0.125) (0.011)
[0.765] [0.136] [0.663] [0.509] [0.745] [0.819] [0.292]
Constant 0.023 0.035*** 0.013 0.032** 0.022 0.052 0.005
(0.027) (0.006) (0.046) (0.009) (0.035) (0.080) (0.005)
1st Test Score 0.847 0.872 0.821 0.848 0.854 0.798 0.874
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.015 0.001 0.030 -0.032 0.015 0.013 0.017
Sample All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 0.963 0.431 0.802 0.875 0.730 0.178 0.002
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 (wild) 0.987 0.484 0.751 0.935 0.753 0.222 0.006
Observations 118 60 58 12 99 42 76
R-squared 0.001 0.025 0.003 0.064 0.001 0.050 0.037
notes: Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values
are shown in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008) using 1000 replications.
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Figure B1: Proportion of students eating more than half a healthy item
a) Full Sample
a) Sample with less than 100% Choice in Baseline
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Table B1: Effect on Eating More than Half for Overall Sample and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Ate More than Half a Healthy Item
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.114* 0.129 0.096 0.107 0.120 0.096 0.133**
(0.063) (0.084) (0.079) (0.086) (0.072) (0.108) (0.063)
[0.194] [0.178] [0.288] [0.272] [0.144] [0.438] [0.070]
Competition (=1) * Week 6 0.082 0.099 0.061 0.124 0.078 0.108 0.062
(0.073) (0.104) (0.073) (0.086) (0.088) (0.111) (0.083)
[0.354] [0.416] [0.490] [0.168] [0.420] [0.418] [0.505]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.054 0.051 0.053 0.008 0.057 -0.054 0.219***
(0.060) (0.076) (0.067) (0.072) (0.066) (0.072) (0.048)
[0.464] [0.561] [0.438] [0.927] [0.452] [0.498] [0.014]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 0.008 0.040 -0.023 -0.010 0.005 -0.068 0.143
(0.075) (0.091) (0.078) (0.101) (0.083) (0.083) (0.090)
[0.893] [0.695] [0.813] [0.915] [0.989] [0.488] [0.172]
Constant 0.599*** 0.628*** 0.567*** 0.592*** 0.606*** 0.602*** 0.588***
(0.022) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.025) (0.032) (0.021)
Sample All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 0.410 0.356 0.638 0.320 0.437 0.109 0.193
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 2-5 (wild) 0.488 0.428 0.687 0.360 0.460 0.164 0.256
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 6 0.327 0.502 0.340 0.212 0.387 0.049 0.294
P-Value: Comp = Ind Incentive Week 6 (wild) 0.446 0.607 0.390 0.256 0.444 0.054 0.352
Observations 14,714 7,719 6,994 2,495 11,838 7,916 6,798
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.025
Number of pupils 638 328 310 114 509 343 295
notes: Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are
shown in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008). Column [2] includes only female and column [3] contains only
males. Column [4] includes only students who are eligible for free school meals (FSM) and column [5] contains those students not eligible for FSM;
there are 15 students for whom we are missing FSM status. Column [6] contains only students in Year 2 and column [7] contains only students in
Year 5.
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Table B2: Effect on Eating More Than Half for Sample with Week 1 less than 100% Choice and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Ate Mopre than Half a Healthy Item
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.190** 0.145 0.218** 0.268** 0.175** 0.141 0.203**
(0.076) (0.095) (0.088) (0.114) (0.076) (0.100) (0.087)
[0.024] [0.178] [0.042] [0.104] [0.038] [0.230] [0.036]
Competition (=1) * Week 6 0.117* 0.074 0.143** 0.245** 0.086 0.119 0.094
(0.066) (0.102) (0.064) (0.095) (0.068) (0.069) (0.099)
[0.126] [0.501] [0.052] [0.058] [0.288] [0.172] [0.404]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.078 0.001 0.130 0.096 0.061 -0.193*** 0.216***
(0.068) (0.091) (0.082) (0.171) (0.069) (0.063) (0.063)
[0.318] [0.973] [0.292] [0.695] [0.466] [0.016] [0.008]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 -0.006 -0.024 0.003 0.049 -0.030 -0.326*** 0.133
(0.096) (0.102) (0.118) (0.272) (0.097) (0.073) (0.106)
[0.979] [0.795] [0.979] [0.617] [0.773] [0.004] [0.270]
Constant 0.342*** 0.372*** 0.314*** 0.231*** 0.363*** 0.291*** 0.381***
(0.025) (0.030) (0.029) (0.047) (0.025) (0.031) (0.027)
Sample All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wks 2-5 0.199 0.104 0.420 0.391 0.183 0.001 0.883
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wks 2-5 (wild) 0.220 0.134 0.513 0.511 0.228 0.008 0.879
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wk 6 0.166 0.121 0.274 0.507 0.156 0.000 0.692
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wk 6 (wild) 0.210 0.110 0.322 0.555 0.124 0.000 0.665
Observations 5,466 2,583 2,883 799 4,476 2,360 3,106
R-squared 0.057 0.065 0.052 0.082 0.051 0.072 0.058
Number of pupils 215 102 113 29 179 93 122
notes: Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are
shown in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008). Column [2] includes only female and column [3] contains only
males. Column [4] includes only students who are eligible for free school meals (FSM) and column [5] contains those students not eligible for FSM;
there are 15 students for whom we are missing FSM status. Column [6] contains only students in Year 2 and column [7] contains only students in
Year 5.
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Table B3: Effect on Attendance On Overall Sample and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Attended School
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.017 0.002 0.037* 0.029 0.015 0.021 0.016
(0.014) (0.021) (0.018) (0.051) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021)
[0.276] [0.897] [0.068] [0.621] [0.396] [0.304] [0.559]
Competition (=1) * Week 6 -0.009 -0.023 0.014 -0.014 -0.006 -0.011 -0.004
(0.017) (0.026) (0.020) (0.061) (0.015) (0.027) (0.028)
[0.655] [0.412] [0.474] [0.811] [0.675] [0.645] [0.833]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.023 0.009 0.040* 0.002 0.029 0.015 0.032
(0.022) (0.029) (0.023) (0.042) (0.026) (0.018) (0.037)
[0.414] [0.783] [0.116] [0.931] [0.306] [0.444] [0.482]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 -0.022 -0.031 -0.007 -0.061* -0.007 -0.007 -0.035
(0.048) (0.050) (0.050) (0.032) (0.049) (0.020) (0.099)
[0.733] [0.581] [0.937] [0.104] [0.865] [0.717] [0.809]
Constant 0.945*** 0.945*** 0.946*** 0.971*** 0.938*** 0.956*** 0.934***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) (0.013)
Sample All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wks 2-5 0.800 0.814 0.877 0.411 0.551 0.790 0.634
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wks 2-5 (wild) 0.831 0.859 0.917 0.482 0.579 0.837 0.689
Observations 16,472 8,548 7,917 2,843 13,200 8,596 7,876
R-squared 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.007
Number of pupils 643 331 312 115 513 345 298
notes: Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are
shown in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008). Column [2] includes only female and column [3] contains only
males. Column [4] includes only students who are eligible for free school meals (FSM) and column [5] contains those students not eligible for FSM;
there are 15 students for whom we are missing FSM status. Column [6] contains only students in Year 2 and column [7] contains only students in
Year 5.
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Table B4: Effect on Attendance for Sample with Week 1 less than 100% Choice and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Attended School
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 -0.015 -0.063 0.030 0.046** -0.025 -0.032 0.011
(0.023) (0.037) (0.027) (0.019) (0.028) (0.038) (0.034)
[0.563] [0.322] [0.380] [0.076] [0.424] [0.424] [0.785]
Competition (=1) * Week 6 -0.062** -0.130*** 0.010 -0.003 -0.067** -0.081* -0.034
(0.022) (0.041) (0.034) (0.036) (0.029) (0.042) (0.036)
[0.034] [0.04] [0.765] [0.777] [0.070] [0.054] [0.394]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.062 0.041 0.078** 0.040*** 0.065 0.057 0.063
(0.040) (0.060) (0.035) (0.005) (0.044) (0.070) (0.048)
[0.204] [0.533] [0.066] [0.124] [0.208] [0.440] [0.386]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 0.045 -0.020 0.091** -0.100 0.059 0.028 0.053
(0.041) (0.071) (0.042) (0.059) (0.044) (0.096) (0.034)
[0.266] [0.823] [0.014] [0.507] [0.206] [0.789] [0.240]
Constant 0.909*** 0.901*** 0.915*** 0.980*** 0.894*** 0.931*** 0.892***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014)
Sample All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wks 2-5 0.0443 0.0496 0.256 0.757 0.0324 0.163 0.233
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wks 2-5 (wild) 0.130 0.228 0.306 0.785 0.136 0.150 0.430
Observations 6,085 2,870 3,210 838 5,047 2,582 3,503
R-squared 0.008 0.016 0.006 0.014 0.010 0.006 0.011
Number of pupil id 220 105 115 30 183 95 125
notes: Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are
shown in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008). Column [2] includes only female and column [3] contains only
males. Column [4] includes only students who are eligible for free school meals (FSM) and column [5] contains those students not eligible for FSM;
there are 15 students for whom we are missing FSM status. Column [6] contains only students in Year 2 and column [7] contains only students in
Year 5.
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Table B5: Effect on Bringing Packed Lunch On Overall Sample and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Brought a Packed Lunch
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.014 0.001 0.008 -0.014
(0.021) (0.032) (0.023) (0.039) (0.025) (0.034) (0.025)
[0.993] [0.995] [0.957] [0.737] [0.951] [0.849] [0.635]
Competition (=1) * Week 6 -0.038 -0.065 -0.003 0.008 -0.042 -0.063 -0.020
(0.030) (0.046) (0.033) (0.044) (0.038) (0.043) (0.036)
[0.220] [0.176] [0.923] [0.883] [0.332] [0.202] [0.621]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 -0.013 -0.001 -0.022 -0.038* 0.004 -0.014 -0.014
(0.025) (0.035) (0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.033) (0.037)
[0.569] [1.02] [0.394] [0.200] [0.827] [0.681] [0.815]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 -0.041 -0.037 -0.040 -0.057 -0.021 -0.078* -0.008
(0.036) (0.052) (0.029) (0.042) (0.036) (0.043) (0.055)
[0.256] [0.509] [0.268] [0.258] [0.587] [0.128] [0.919]
Constant 0.499*** 0.489*** 0.511*** 0.187*** 0.566*** 0.461*** 0.539***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Sample All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wks 2-5 0.525 0.968 0.421 0.255 0.919 0.0684 0.996
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wks 2-5 (wild) 0.583 1.035 0.482 0.306 0.865 0.092 0.957
Observations 14,575 7,622 6,953 2,501 11,671 7,348 7,227
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002
Number of pupils 623 322 301 110 498 329 294
notes: Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are
shown in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008). Column [2] includes only female and column [3] contains only
males. Column [4] includes only students who are eligible for free school meals (FSM) and column [5] contains those students not eligible for FSM;
there are 15 students for whom we are missing FSM status. Column [6] contains only students in Year 2 and column [7] contains only students in
Year 5.
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Table B6: Effect on Bringing Packed Lunch for Sample with Week 1 less than 100% Choice and Its Subgroups
Dependent Variable (=1) if Student Brought a Packed Lunch
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Competition (=1) * Week 2-5 0.007 -0.021 0.040 0.033 -0.000 0.020 -0.019
(0.023) (0.040) (0.026) (0.118) (0.023) (0.029) (0.041)
[0.719] [0.641] [0.124] [0.783] [0.991] [0.543] [0.657]
Competition (=1) * Week 6 -0.004 -0.076 0.080** -0.006 0.003 -0.039 0.005
(0.036) (0.071) (0.030) (0.121) (0.043) (0.071) (0.058)
[0.957] [0.348] [0.032] [0.985] [0.971] [0.515] [0.925]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 2-5 0.036 0.054* 0.022 0.007 0.053* 0.060 0.027
(0.025) (0.030) (0.038) (0.005) (0.028) (0.054) (0.022)
[0.204] [0.182] [0.643] [0.430] [0.072] [0.595] [0.408]
Individual Incentive (=1) * Week 6 0.018 0.044 -0.003 -0.017 0.048 -0.039 0.050
(0.046) (0.076) (0.041) (0.014) (0.041) (0.072) (0.057)
[0.751] [0.651] [0.941] [0.505] [0.350] [0.527] [0.645]
Constant 0.532*** 0.527*** 0.536*** 0.355*** 0.564*** 0.509*** 0.549***
(0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.042) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012)
Sample All Females Males FSM Non-FSM Year 2 Year 5
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wks 2-5 0.318 0.0518 0.646 0.825 0.0749 0.466 0.262
P-value for Competition=Individual for Wks 2-5 (wild) 0.384 0.112 0.697 0.821 0.100 0.781 0.302
Observations 5,376 2,555 2,821 771 4,412 2,195 3,181
R-squared 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.002
Number of pupils 214 102 112 29 178 93 121
notes: Robust standard errors clustered at school level are included in parentheses; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. Wild P-Values are
shown in brackets and are estimated following Cameron, Gelbach, Miller (2008). Column [2] includes only female and column [3] contains only
males. Column [4] includes only students who are eligible for free school meals (FSM) and column [5] contains those students not eligible for FSM;
there are 15 students for whom we are missing FSM status. Column [6] contains only students in Year 2 and column [7] contains only students in
Year 5.
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